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Concessionaires, Financiers and
Communities: Implementing Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights to Land in Transnational
Development Projects by Kinnari I. Bhatt1
ETHAN GUTHRO2
THE PUBLICATION OF DOCTOR KINNARI I. Bhatt’s frst book, Concessionaires,

Financiers and Communities: Implementing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights to Land
in Transnational Development Projects (“Concessionaires”), comes at a time of
uncertainty for the feld of Aboriginal law in Canada and across the globe.
To contextualize the key themes found throughout Concessionaires, and to
provide a basis upon which my critiques shall be built, it is important to briefy
detail recent developments in Aboriginal law in Canada.3

1.
2.
3.

(Cambridge University Press, 2020).
JD (2022), Osgoode Hall Law School.
Defnitions of Indigenous and Aboriginal law may vary depending upon one’s
jurisdiction. For the purposes of this review, I have chosen to adopt the well-established
Canadian distinction wherein Indigenous law refers to the traditional legal practices of
Indigenous nations, while Aboriginal law refers to the constitutionally-enshrined rights of
Indigenous peoples.
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In late 2007, the General Assembly of the United Nations voted to adopt the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).4
Comprised of forty-six articles, this comprehensive, non-binding text details
the rights of Indigenous peoples “to maintain and strengthen their institutions,
cultures and traditions, and to promote their development in accordance with
their aspirations and needs.”5 In Canada, Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was introduced to the
House of Commons on 3 December 2020.6 Tis bill—the frst step in satisfying
campaign promises made by Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the Liberal Party
of Canada in both the 2015 and 2019 election cycles7—elicited mixed reactions
from Indigenous leaders, legal academics, and the greater public alike. However,
the bill was ultimately adopted, receiving royal assent on 21 June 2021, and
coming into force immediately thereafter.8
Initial responses to Bill C-15 were highly critical; one prominent Indigenous
policy analyst went so far as to characterize it as “an attack on Indigenous
sovereignty and self-determination.”9 However, the overarching consensus
4.

5.
6.

7.

8.
9.

GA Res 295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess, Supp No 49, UN Doc A/Res/61/295 [UNDRIP].
See also United Nations, “United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”
(n.d.), online: <www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-rightsof-indigenous-peoples.html> [perma.cc/NE7C-57U9]. Only four countries objected to the
United Nations’ declaration at the time of adoption: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
the United States. As of 2010, each of these countries have reversed their objector status.
UNDRIP, supra note 4 at 4.
Parliament of Canada, “An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples” (2021), online: <www.parl.ca/LegisInfo/en/bill/43-2/c-15> [perma.cc/
UUZ2-QYCB]; Bill C-15, An Act respecting the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, 2nd Sess, 43rd Parl, 2020 [Bill C-15].
Ferdouse Asef & Erick Laming, “Indigenous Peoples Will Continue to Sufer Under
Liberal Minority,” Te Star (4 December 2019), online: <www.thestar.com/opinion/
contributors/2019/12/04/indigenous-peoples-will-continue-to-sufer-under-liberal-minority.
html> [perma.cc/34DZ-SKJT?type=image]; Jorge Barrera, “Trudeau: A Liberal Government
Would Repeal, Amend All Federal Laws Tat Fail to Respect Indigenous Rights,” Aboriginal
Peoples Television News (15 October 2015), online: <www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/
trudeau-a-liberal-government-would-repeal-amend-all-federal-laws-that-fail-to-respectindigenous-rights> [perma.cc/C9QK-ZYKY].
Government of Canada, “Backgrounder: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples Act” (last modifed 10 December 2021), online: <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/
declaration/about-apropos.html> [perma.cc/R5VC-LZLU].
Russ Diabo, “Federal UNDRIP Bill C-15 is An Attack on Indigenous Sovereignty and
Self-Determination: Opinion,” Aboriginal Peoples Television Network (21 December 2020),
online: <www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/undrip-bill-c-15-federal-government-soverigntyruss-diabo> [perma.cc/9QSJ-26VQ].
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seemed to be one of wary optimism.10 It is worthy of note that Bill C-15 does
not render UNDRIP law in Canada; instead, it simply afrms the application
of UNDRIP and provides an “action plan to achieve the objectives of the
Declaration.”11 As of March 2022, the only decision citing the Act notes that “[i]t
remains to be seen whether the passage of UNDRIP legislation is simply vacuous
political bromide or whether it heralds a substantive change in the common law
respecting Aboriginal rights including Aboriginal title.”12
Five articles of UNDRIP, all detailing various ways in which nation states
should implement the concept of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) into
domestic law and their dealings with Indigenous communities, are of signifcance
to this review.13 Canadian jurisprudence has long afrmed the existence of the
Crown’s duty to consult with Indigenous nations. Beginning with Haida Nation
v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests) (“Haida”), the Supreme Court of Canada
has established a three-part test to determine whether the duty to consult has
been triggered.14 However, the duty to consult is just that—a duty to consult.
In her reasons in Haida, Chief Justice McLachlin (as she then was) concluded
that “[t]his process does not give Aboriginal groups a veto over what can be done
with land pending fnal proof of the claim.…Rather, what is required is a process
of balancing interests, of give and take.”15 Juxtaposing the implicative language
of Canada’s duty to consult framework with UNDRIP’s requisite need for consent
explains why some were hesitant to embrace the implementation of UNDRIP
into domestic law. In other words, by adopting the UNDRIP principle of FPIC
in Canadian law, consultation under the Haida framework would seem to grant

10. Kevin Hille, Roger Townshend & Jaclyn McNamara, “Bill C-15 (UNDRIP Act)
Commentary” (2021), online (pdf ): <i4b251yqxbh32mme4165ebzu-wpengine.netdna-ssl.
com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/OKT-Bill-C-15-UNDRIP-Commentary-2.pdf>
[perma.cc/X7GD-7RKY].
11. Bill C-15, supra note 6, s 6(1).
12. Tomas and Saik’uz First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc, 2022 BCSC 15 at para 212.
Justice Kent notes that, although the Act “supports a robust interpretation of Aboriginal
rights…I am still bound by precedent to apply the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court of Canada to the facts of this particular case and I will leave it to that Court to
determine what efect, if any, UNDRIP legislation has on the common law” (ibid).
13. UNDRIP, supra note 4, arts 10, 11, 19, 28, 29.
14. 2004 SCC 73 [Haida]. See also Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project
Assessment Director), 2004 SCC 74; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada (Minister of
Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69; Beckman v Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010
SCC 53; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43.
15. Haida, supra note 14 at para 48.

834

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

Indigenous nations the veto power that Chief Justice McLachlin explicitly
failed to fnd.
In Concessionaires, Dr. Bhatt—a project fnance lawyer with extensive
experience in transnational development, international trade, and human rights
law—attempts to reconcile the inner workings of transnational development
projects with the notion of inherent (and, following the ratifcation and
implementation of UNDRIP, proclaimed) Indigenous rights to land. Dr.
Bhatt’s stated goal is to “map the legal terrain around the understudied universe
of transnational development projects as they increasingly interface with
[I]ndigenous peoples’ rights to land.”16 It is my position that the author’s goal has
been accomplished.
Concessionaires begins with an overview of the global mechanisms governing
Indigenous peoples’ rights to land and transnational project fnancing, providing
the reader with the context needed to comprehend the components of complex
project fnancing structures. Two concepts introduced in the overview—“Coping
Strategies, Lacunas and Fragmentation in the Formal Legal Framework”17 and
“Private Mechanisms and Behaviours for Implementing Indigenous Peoples’
Rights to Land”18—are then examined through the critical analysis of global
legislation and jurisprudence, academic papers, and NGO policies. Te fnal
chapters of the book situate the author’s critique within case studies of transnational
project fnancing successes and failures, resulting in several recommendations for
systemic reform.
To contextualize the need for this contribution to academic legal literature,
Dr. Bhatt aims to explain the notion of sociolegal confict in oil, gas, mineral,
and infrastructural development projects in developing nations.19 Such conficts,
described as “triangular tensions,” between Indigenous peoples, nation states,
and private actors, have increased in frequency commensurately with the
intensifcation of industrialization in developed and developing nations.20
Further, she underscores existing issues within the normative concept of due
diligence by highlighting the power imbalances that arise in projects requiring
mass global capital: “[D]ue diligence fails to interrogate crucial interfaces;
specifcally, between private mechanisms…and local or international legal norms
16.
17.
18.
19.

Bhatt, supra note 1 at 9.
Bhatt, supra note 1 at 52.
Bhatt, supra note 1 at 83.
I use the terms “developed” and “developing” subject to a lack of more succinct terminology.
However, I remain cognizant that these terms are often used to convey subtextual neoliberal
or colonial ideals not widely accepted beyond the praxis of contemporary hegemonies.
20. Bhatt, supra note 1 at 1-4.
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on [I]ndigenous rights as well as the power dynamics and behaviours that drive
decision-making at these hidden hotspots.”21 Tese failures become readily
apparent in the context of the Canadian duty to consult/FPIC dichotomy. One
must wonder whether capital interests underpinned the political hesitancy to
support Bill C-15.
As noted above, Concessionaires makes extensive use of case study analyses,
including those of the Mongolian Oyu Tolgoi gold and copper mine,22 the
Panamanian Barro Blanco dam,23 and the Ugandan Bujagali Hydropower Project.24
Such analyses provide insight into the technical components of project fnancing
mechanisms and allow for a greater understanding of the ways in which private
actors can legally exploit fragmented politico-legal regimes. However, I fnd that
the author’s reliance on these case studies is somewhat excessive—over the span of
approximately 180 pages (excluding the preface and introductory chapter), more
than 100 in-text references are made to other sections or chapters of the book.
While providing a thorough overview of the current state of afairs,
supplemented by in-depth case studies of past successes and failures in
transnational public–private partnership developments, Dr. Bhatt’s analysis is
invariably framed through the lens of late-stage capitalistic paternalism towards
Indigeneity. In drawing attention to this, my goal is not to discredit Dr. Bhatt’s
research. Instead, it is my hope that, in recognizing the author’s perspective,
readers of this review may take it upon themselves to seek a critical perspective
developed beyond the scope of project fnancing law.
Te author’s perspective manifests clearly in her proposed “recommendations
for an overall remedial agenda.”25 Prefacing her recommendations, Dr. Bhatt
advances the following on the notion of a regulatory defcit existing within the
realm of project fnancing in transnational development:
At various points it has been argued that the legal architecture around development
projects fails to adequately recognise and regulate for [I]ndigenous peoples’ rights –
deprioritising them in favour of a larger political economy of land commodifcation
that has, in turn, been supported by the rules that sustain global capital investment
and the global fnancial architecture–contract and private property rights. At the
moment, practice around the recognition and implementation of [I]ndigenous
rights to land in these projects is, by and large, taking place within a shielded zone
which prioritises the projects’ creditors and shareholders, to the obvious beneft of
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Ibid at 11.
Ibid at 124-36.
Ibid at 136-44.
Ibid, ch 6.
Ibid at 184.
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concessionaires and fnanciers and the detriment of communities. Te result for
those communities: repetitive injustices and exclusion.26

Fewer than ten pages later, Dr. Bhatt begins to inventory her proposed changes
to the existing legal and regulatory oversight processes.27 Te frst suggestion
is to implement legislation that recognizes “the special vulnerability of
land-connected people in the context of transnational development projects.”28
Tis opening recommendation, in conjunction with the author’s overview of
prevailing Indigenous views on land and water in chapter one,29 encapsulates the
notion of Indigenous peoples’ deep connection to land as meriting more than a
surface-level acknowledgement. Tis involves a careful and thorough overview of
the complex, interdependent relationship between Indigenous peoples and their
traditional land.
Te sentiment underlying this recommendation, however, is subsequently
undermined by the ffth and seventh recommendations. Inthese recommendations,
the author details her suggestion for a potential mechanism whereby a
concessionaire could set up a blind trust for the deposit of funds related to the
resettlement of Indigenous peoples.30 To frst establish the unique signifcance of
land to Indigenous identity, only to later provide a framework for the de facto
expropriation of land by private actors, seems counterintuitive.
By seemingly assuming that each of the three groups—private actors, nation
states, and Indigenous peoples—would approach the trust creation process
from the same starting point, the proposed changes to resettlement processes
mischaracterize the unequal bargaining power found throughout this unique,
triadic relationship. In turn, the systemic inequities faced by Indigenous peoples
become further removed from any such negotiatory mechanism. Further, they
26. Ibid at 184-85.
27. Tis section of the book commences with the preface that “[i]t is important to keep in mind
that given the level of fragmentation, powerful vested interests and regulatory defcit in the
feld, the quest for a perfect solution is, in practice, somewhat illusive” (ibid at 192-93).
28. Ibid at 193.
29. Dr. Bhatt explains:
For [I]ndigenous people, land and water are regarded as sacred, inextricably connected to their
identity, culture, sense of meaning and survival. Unlike Western notions that view land and
the resources within it as property rights, to be exclusively owned and enclosed for productive
potential and value creation, [I]ndigenous worldviews may not diferentiate between the earth
and the resources it supports, seeing land in a wider concept that relates to the collective right
to survival as a people, for the reproduction of their culture and for their own development
and plans for life (ibid at 3).

30. Ibid at 196-97.
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work to induce a shift in the responsibility of upholding Indigenous rights to
land from local governance systems to transnational corporations. Given the
track record of transnational corporations operating abroad, is this really the
most efcacious step forward?
Tough not explicitly stated, it is possible that Dr. Bhatt intended for
her recommendations to follow a hierarchical structure, wherein the earlier
recommendations reign supreme over the later. Read in this way, recommendations
fve and seven could be interpreted to serve as a means of impact remediation
rather than mitigation.31 Providing suggestions for the ways in which Indigenous
peoples could be compensated for the expropriation of their traditional lands is
a concrete response to this fragmented legal system. However, by accepting that
Indigenous land rights will continue to be violated for corporate gain, the author
is addressing the symptoms of the problem rather than the problem itself.
Consider, for instance, Rio Tinto’s 2010 Oyu Tolgoi project, wherein two
separate human rights complaints relating to the resettlement process were
fled by Mongolian communities of nomadic herders.32 Tese complaints were
based upon the premise that, per both national and international legislation,
the herders’ rights to access their land and water resources were being infringed.
In 2015, following Rio Tinto’s receipt of these complaints, construction of the
second phase of underground development commenced, and in 2016, the fnal
phase of construction began.33
Dr. Bhatt notes that, as UNDRIP is a non-binding declaration, and as the
project was subject only to the project fnancing organization’s policies in place
at the time, FPIC was not a prerequisite of project funding approval.34 Te
Mongolian government, an original signatory of UNDRIP, allowed this project
to continue despite multiple complaints that actions contrary to UNDRIP were
being undertaken by Rio Tinto. Tis disregard for the articles of UNDRIP,
specifcally those detailing Indigenous peoples’ rights to self-determination
31. Tis interpretation is furthered by the subtitle prefacing Dr. Bhatt’s recommendations:
“Proposed Remedial Agenda.” However, it is my position that the implementation of a
remedial agenda for instances in which Indigenous land rights are violated—rather than a
robust framework to ensure that Indigenous land rights are not violated—is a reactionary
solution to a complex issue. Ibid at 192.
32. Ibid at 125. Mongolia voted in favour of the 2007 adoption of UNDRIP at the UN
General Assembly.
33. Bhatt, supra note 1 at 125.
34. Ibid at 123-24. Te Oyu Tolgoi project was subject to the 2006 International Finance
Corporation’s Performance Standards and the 2008 European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development’s Environmental and Social Policy (ibid at 124).

838

(2022) 59 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

and FPIC, highlights the underlying issue: the transnational development
process itself.
Te eighth recommendation in this section, titled “Promoting State-Based
Non-Judicial Mechanisms,”35 is, in my view, one of the book’s greatest strengths.
Dr. Bhatt describes the ways in which informal grievance mechanisms operate,
providing both praise and critique of such systems. Of note is that, while the
Optional Protocol to the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“Optional Protocol”) may have been available to aid the Indigenous Mongolian
herders in their complaints, the mechanism was inaccessible due to the herders’
lack of knowledge that the Optional Protocol exists.36 With the goal of fostering
systemic reform, in which the implementation of Indigenous peoples’ rights
to land in transnational development projects can be successful, it is clear that
systemic inaccessibility must be addressed. As the author astutely points out,
“[s]tates and advocates need to do more to promote these mechanisms known as
a potential advocacy tool for cases involving development projects, the state and
private actors.”37
In sum, Concessionaires provides a novel contribution to the transnational
development and project fnancing literature that is theoretical yet practicable.
Tough some of the author’s recommendations are arguably contradictory, their
grounding is strong. In just a few pages, Dr. Bhatt was able to construct a thorough
overview of the intricate nature of Indigenous peoples’ unique relationship to
their traditional lands. Dr. Bhatt set out to reconcile this relationship with the
complex, technocratic nature of project fnancing in transnational development
projects. In my opinion, this objective was not only met but was achieved with
delicacy and ease. With such a nuanced approach to analyzing the complex
inner workings of the transnational project development process, academics
and legal practitioners alike can beneft from the content of this book. Given
the increasing frequency with which Indigenous peoples’ rights to land intersect
with international development, I am confdent that Dr. Bhatt’s work on project
fnancing will emerge as an important piece of scholarship in its feld.

35. Ibid at 197-98.
36. Ibid. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
GA Res 8/2, UNHCR, 63rd Sess, UN Doc A/RES/63/117 (entered into force 5 May 2013).
37. Ibid at 198.

